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Case Commen' s
Constitutional Law: Matching Financial Grants
to Church-Related Colleges Unconstitutional
Plaintiffs challenged the validity of several Maryland stat-
utes, which provided matching financial grants to four private
church-related colleges, on the ground that they violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution and provisions of the state constitution.' A di-
vided court of appeals reversed the dismissal of the complaint,
holding that grants to three of the colleges, while permissible
under Maryland's constitution, violated the establishment clause
of the first amendment.2 Horace Mann League v. Board of Pub.
Works, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966).
Although substantial litigation involving the establishment
clause has arisen, the Supreme Court has rarely dealt with the
effect of this clause upon direct financial grants to church-re-
lated schools.3 In Everson v. Board of Educ.,4 the Court held
that indirect state financial aid reimbursing parents for the cost
of transporting their chlidren to chuxch-related schools did not
contravene the establishment clause. The Court relied upon the
state's secular interest in the safety of its children, and dis-
missed the benefit to religion as being negligible.5 Recently,
1. The establishment clause was made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment by .Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947). See MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, Articles 15, 23, 36.
2. The grants to Western Maryland College (Methodist), St.
Joseph College (Roman Catholic), and Notre Dame College (Roman
Catholic) were held unconstitutional. The grant to Hood College
(United Church of Christ) was upheld on the ground that the college
was nonsectarian for purposes of the first amendment, although it
maintained loose church ties.
3. Several reasons for this dearth of authority are evident. First,
taxpayers lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of numerous
federal financial programs involving aid to church-related schools. See
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Elliot v. White, 23 F.2d
997 (D.C. Cir. 1928); KuRIAm, RELIGION AND THE LAW 32-36 (1962).
Second, numerous state constitutions explicitly proscribe aid to church-
related schools. E.g., MINN. CONST. art. 8, § 2. See also Drinan, The
Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools, in THE WALL BE-
TWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 55, 71 (Oaks ed. 1963). Finally, in several
cases involving financial aid to church-related institutions, the consti-
tutional issue was not reached. See, e.g., Cochrane v. Board of Educ.,
281 U.S. 370 (1930); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
4. 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see 45 Mhcm L. REV. 1001 (1947); 22 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 400 (1947).
5. Everson has given rise to the child benefit theory. See La
Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited, 13 J. PUB. L. 76 (1964);
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in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,6 a case involving a volun-
tary Bible reading program, the court stated that "to withstand
the strictures of the establishment clause there must be a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."7 This suggests that govern-
mental aid to church-related institutions, which is strictly lim-
ited to secular functions, and which is justified by a secular state
interest, does not violate the establishment clause.8
Although the state decisions are not entirely consistent,
several state courts have found financial aid to be unconstitu-
tional when not strictly confined to the secular fuctions of
a sectarian institution.9 For example, in Almond v. Day,10 use
of tax money for orphans' tuition to church-related schools, was
held unconstitutional. And in Swart v. South Burlington Town-
ship," the court invalidated a statute which permitted local
school districts to pay the tuition of students attending private
schools, in lieu of furnishing free public schools. Arguably,
these decisions may be consistent with Everson and Schempp,
for tuition benefits the institution as a whole, rather than a
specific secular function of the institution.
It has been suggested that all aid, even if carefully confined
to the secular activities of church-related institutions, is ac-
tually aid to their religious activities, since this enables the in-
Comment, 21 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 176, 179 (1947). The Supreme Court
of Delaware recently rejected the child benefit theory, refusing to
follow Everson in Opinion of the Justices, 216 A.2d 668 (Del. 1966)
(free transportation for nonpublic school pupils violates state consti-
tution); accord, Board of Educ. v. Allen, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct.
1966); see 31 ALBANY L. REV. 152 (1966).
6. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
7. Id. at 222.
8. Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools:
An Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1395, 1445 (1966).
9. The use of tax funds to pay private school tuition also was
struck down. Williams v. Board of Trustees, 173 Ky. 708, 191 S.W. 507
(1917); Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758 (1879); Synod of Dakota v.
State, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632 (1891). However, it has been held that
a state could defray expenses of delinquents at a church-related in-
dustrial school. St. Hedwig's School v. Cook County, 289 fll. 432, 124
N.E. 629 (1919). Tuition payments for veterans were found to be per-
missible. Veterans' Welfare Bd. v. Riley, 189 Cal. 159, 208 Pac. 678
(1922). See Manning, Aid to Education--State Style, 29 FORDHAm L.
REv. 525 (1961); Note, Current Legislation, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 387
(1961), concerning the constitutionality of a New York state plan for
partial tuition payments to students attending private colleges, includ-
ing those with church affiliation.
10. 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955); 42 VA. L. REV. 437 (1956).
11. 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514 (1960) ; 29 FoRDHAm L. REV. 578 (1961);
59 McH. L. REV. 1254 (1961). See also Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1309 (1962).
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stitutions to free their own funds for religious uses.12 Carried
to its logical conclusion, the freeing of funds argument would
operate to bar any form of governmental aid to church-related
institutions. However, this argument appears to have been im-
plicitly rejected by the Court in both Everson and Schempp.
Everson allowed state aid for transportation although this money
might release funds for sectarian functions. Schempp, by re-
quiring that the "primary effect [was not] to advance religion,"
appears to recognize that a secondary effect, such as freeing of
funds, is constitutionally permissible. In Murray v. Comptroller
of Treasury,13 decided shortly before Horace Mann, the Maryland
court explicitly rejected this argument while upholding tax ex-
emptions for church owned property. :14
In Horace Mann, the court held that the controlling factor
for constitutional purposes was the degree of "religiousness" of
the aided institution, since not all state financial aid to religion
is prohibited by the establishment clause. 15 The court relied
upon a number of factors which it thought were indicative of
the substantiality of each institution's religious orientation: the
institution's stated purposes; the character of its governing board,
administration, student body, and faculty; the place of religion
in the overall program; the accomplishments of the overall pro-
gram; the institution's affiliation with religious groups and the
support derived from them; and its image in the community."0
By concentrating upon the religiousness of the institution
receiving aid,' 7 the majority's standards differ from the stand-
12. 77 HARv. L. REV. 1353 (1964); 22 LA. L. R.v. 266, 268 (1961).
13. 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897 (1966). The exemptions were up-
held by finding that churches tend to attract people and thus increase
the general tax base. The secular services provided by churches, such
as counseling, recreation, and cultural activities were also found to be
secular justifications. The court also believed that the free exercise
clause might present difficulties should the exemptions not be granted.
Since the secular benefits and services provided by even the most
religiously oriented colleges are more obvious than those provided by
churches, it is difficult to reconcile Horace Mann with Murray.
14. "Logically, [the freeing of funds] argument is strong. But, as
this Court has said before, logic is a minion of the law, not its master."
241 Md. at 399, 216 A.2d at 906.
15. 242 Md. at 671, 220 A.2d at 65.
16. Id. at 672, 220 A.2d at 65, 66.
I7. Following the analysis suggested in Everson and Schempp, the
dissent argued that providing expanded opportunities for higher educa-
tion constituted a valid secular purpose for the grants, and that because
of the relatively large number of church-related colleges, no workable
alternatives were available to accomplish this purpose. 242 Md. at 645,
698-99, 220 A.2d 51, 81.
[Vol. 51:962
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ards of both Everson and Schempp. In those cases the Supreme
Court suggested that where a financial grant was designed to
accomplish a secular purpose, where no reasonable alternatives
were available, and where the benefit to religion would be in-
direct or merely incidental to accomplishment of the secular
purpose, the establishment clause would not be violated. The
Horace Mann court disregarded the projected uses of the grants,
which were on a matching basis with the college and were to
be used for construction of dining halls, classrooms, and dormi-
tories. Moreover, the opinions neither discussed the availability
of alternatives nor found the primary or direct effects of the
grants to be of concern. Instead, the court implicitly reasoned
that the more religiously oriented the school, the more likely
financial aid would be used to benefit religion to an impermissi-
ble degree. By this reasoning, once an institution is found to
be sufficiently religious, an irrebuttable presumption is raised
that aid to it is unconstitutional. 18
Accepting this interpretation of the reasoning in Horace
Mann, it is arguable that, contrary to its decision in Murray,
the Maryland court placed some reliance on the freeing of
funds argument. Thus, once the primary secular purpose of
financial aid is disregarded and the institution is determined
to be religious, an inference must necessarily follow that the
funds will confer a substantial benefit on the institution's reli-
gious aspects, regardless of how the funds are actually used.
Although an analysis of the religiousness of institutions
might be feasible when applied to aid programs limited to a
few schools, as in Horace Mann, it would be extremely cumber-
some if used to analyze the constitutionality of broad programs.
For instance, in programs such as those instituted by the federal
government, the religiousness of each beneficiary institution
would have to be examined, and some type of quantitative evalu-
ation made to determine whether the overall benefit to religion
was too substantial. Moreover, if only the constitutionality of
particular applications of the program were challenged, al-
though the Horace Mann analysis could satisfactorily dispose of
18. There is some doubt that the majority's interpretation of the
establishment clause will ultimately be accepted in Maryland. Two
members of the four member majority in Horace Mann are no longer
on the court. In a concurring opinion in Truitt v. Board of Pub. Works,
221 A.2d 370, 392-93 (1966), which unanimously upheld state aid to
church-related hospitals, one of the new justices expressed "grave
doubts in regard to the correctness" of Horace Mann and declared that
he would further express his views "as and when the decision in Horace
Mann is later relied on as controlling authority .... "
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any particular case, the possibility of multiplication of litiga-
tion is apparent.
In addition, application of the Horace Mann standard to such
programs as the Higher Education Facilities Act of 196319 ap-
pears undesirable. Under this program the Commissioner of
Education distributes federal funds to the states, which in turn
allocate the funds to various private educational institutions sub-
ject to the commissioner's veto power.20  Funds may be used
only for "academic facilities," which axe defined as structures...
especially designed for instruction or research in the natural
or physical sciences, mathematics, modern foreign languages,
or engineering, or for use as a library." No funds may be uti-
lized for any facility to be used for religious worship or instruc-
tion.21 Nevertheless, the act would violate the first amendment
as interpreted by Horace Mann insofar as it permits govern-
ment funds to benefit strongly religious institutions. Since
there are a large number of colleges with widely varying de-
grees of religious orientation, major benefits to society as a
whole would have to be foregone because of relatively minimal
benefits to religion. Under the Schempp standard, on the other
hand, the act would be constitutional in its entirety.
Thus the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Everson and
Schempp would appear to resolve the conflicting interests under
the establishment clause more satisfactorily than would the
test adopted in Horace Mann. It would permit much needed aid
19. 77 Stat. 363 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. 1966).
20. A memorandum prepared by the Health, Education, and Wel-
fare Department, reprinted in 50 GEo. L.J. 349 (1961), suggested that
government aid to sectarian colleges is permissible, while similar aid
to sectarian primary and secondary schools is not. The Department
argued that religious indoctrination is less pervasive in sectarian col-
leges, that free public higher education is not available to all qualified
college-age students, and that college enrollment does not have the pow-
er of compulsion behind it. These arguments have not been adopted by
any court and appear to be of doubtful validity. Since the pervasive-
ness of religious indoctrination on sectarian college campuses varies
greatly, to refer to it in general terms is meaningless.
If aid to sectarian grade and high schools is unconstitutional be-
cause it will help those institutions propagate the tenets of a particular
faith and will force others to support teaching of beliefs repugnant to
them with their tax dollars, it is difficult to comprehend why such aid
becomes permissible simply because a greater percentage of students
attend church-related colleges than church-related grade and high
schools. Compulsory school attendance laws will exist whether or not
state aid is extended to sectarian schools and colleges; they should be
irrelevant in determining whether such aid is constitutional.
21. 79 Stat. 1266 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 716 (Supp. 1966). The Mary-
land statute involved in Horace Mann contained a similar limitation.
[Vol. 51:962
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to private educational institutions while condemning excessive
and unnecessary benefits to religion.2 2
Constitutional Law: Right to Jury
Trial for Criminal Contempt
Defendant was cited for criminal contempt for violation of
a pendente lite order requiring compliance with a cease-and-de-
sist order. Following denial of his request for a jury trial, de-
fendant was convicted and sentenced to six months' imprison-
ment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, hoZding that de-
fendant did not have a constitutional right to a trial by jury.
However, acting pursuant to its supervisory powers over the in-
ferior federal courts, the Court ruled that in criminal contempt
proceedings a sentence in excess of six months' imprisonment
may not be imposed without a trial by jury. Cheff v. Schnack-
enberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
While both article 1I, section 21 and the sixth amendment 2
of the Constitution ostensibly require a jury trial in all criminal
prosecutions, it is well settled that this right is available only
to the extent that it was recognized at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution. 3 Since the practice at common law was to
try petty offenses in summary proceedings, 4 these offenders were
not entitled to a jury trial.5 However, the present scope of the
22. There is considerable controversy over whether the framers of
the first amendment intended to proscribe all aid to religion, or merely
to prohibit governmental preference of one religion over another. See
Pfeffer & O'Neill, The Meaning of the Establishment Clause: A Debate,
2 BUFFALO L. REV. 225 (1953).
1. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2. Note that cases of impeachment are
excepted.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartialjury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted...."
3. See cases cited in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 191
n.2 (1957). For a contrary view see Fox, HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF
COURT 203-09 (1927). The historical development of criminal contempt
is discussed in Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure
in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in the
Separation of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1010 (1924); Comment, 57 Mrtcn.
L. REv. 258 (1958).
4. Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Con-
stitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REv. 917, 969 (1926).
5. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (city
ordinance regulating secondhand dealers under penalty of a fine of not
19671
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petty offense exception is uncertain for the applicable standards
are to be interpreted in terms of contemporary judicial think-
ing.8 This is the result of the realization that commonly ac-
cepted views as to the severity of punishment may so change
that penalties once considered mild may now be considered so
harsh as to require a trial by jury.7
In Green v. United States,8 the Court broadly asserted that
a criminal contempt proceeding did not constitutionally require
a jury trial, thus implying that the nature of the crime was de-
terminative, regardless of the seriousness of the violation or the
severity of the penalty imposed.9 Subsequently, in United States
v. Barnett,'0 although the Court agreed with the Green decision
to the extent that the nature of the crime was controlling, the
Court stated in dictum that the severity of the penalty imposed
might determine whether a jury trial was constitutionally re-
quired.' Hence, the Court recognized that the severity of the
penalty, as well as the nature of the crime, might be the de-
cisive factors in defining the constitutional scope of petty of-
fenses.
In the instant case, the Court relied upon federal statute
rather than the Constitution to limit the power of the federal
courts to dispose summarily of criminal contempt citations. The
Court drew upon the statutory definition of petty offense,12 its
supervisory power,18 and its power to revise criminal contempt
more than $300 or imprisonment not to exceed 90 days); Schick v.
United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904) (state statute regulating the sale of
oleomargarine under penalty of a fifty dollar fine); Lawton v. Steele,
152 U.S. 133 (1894) (state statute regulating fishing under penalty of a
fifty dollar fine); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891) (city ordinance
regulating public markets under penalty of a twenty-five dollar fine and
imprisonment not to exceed thirty days if fine unpaid).
6. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 728 (1964) (Gold-
berg, J., dissenting); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 193 (1958)(Black, J., dissenting). In applying this concept to criminal contempt,
both Justices stated that although criminal contempt was a petty crime
according to common law standards, the present application of this crime
has transformed it into a serious offense.
7. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627 (1937).
8. 356 U.S. 165 (1957).
9. Id. at 188-89. Although the Court in Green recognized that
criminal contempt was subject to sentences of imprisonment exceeding
one year, it refused to make an exception, based on severity of sentence,
to its determination that criminal contempt was a petty crime.
10. 376 U.S. 681 (1963).
11. Id. at 694 n.12.
12. "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed im-
prisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or
both, is a petty offense." 62 Stat. 684 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964).
13. 63 Stat. 104 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1964).
[Vol. 51:967
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penalties 14 in concluding that it would not tolerate sentences ex-
ceeding six months for criminal contempt unless defendant was
afforded the right to a jury trial.' 5 Since the sentence in Cheff
fell within this proscription, the defendant was not entitled to
a jury trial. Significantly, in reaching this conclusion and re-
jecting the defendant's contention that the right to a jury trial
attaches in all criminal cases, the Court relied upon the dictum in
Barnett to the effect that punishment by summary trial without a
jury is constitutionally limited to those penalties provided by
statute for petty offenses,' 6 regardless of the seriousness of the
offense.
The Court may have based its decision upon its supervisory
power rather than the Constitution in the belief that it was
more prudent to avoid the constitutional issue and its possible
effect upon state proceedings.'7 Although it is true that the
Court may have more strictly limited the severity of penalties
to be imposed in summary proceedings than required by the
Constitution, there is reason to believe that the six-month limi-
tation is a constitutional as well as a supervisory standard.' 8
14. United States v. Green, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958).
15. 384 U.S. at 380.
16. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 694 n.12 (1963). This
suggests that, following Cheff, the Court may feel that in criminal con-
tempt cases the sentence imposed should be the focal point of the con-
stitutional test. In District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617
(1937), it was suggested that at some point the severity of the sentence
may entitle a contemner to a jury trial. Although no specific limit was
set, ninety days was held below whatever that limit might be. The
Barnett decision was the first case to suggest a constitutional limit on
the federal courts' power to summarily punish an individual charged
with criminal contempt. For an analysis of Barnett see Tefft, United
States v. Barnett: 'Twas a Famous Victory, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 984
(1964).
17. The right to jury trial has not yet been applied to state criminal
proceedings. See Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co.,
284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); Olesen v. Trust Co., 245 F.2d 522, 524 (7th
Cir. 1957). However, the remainder of the sixth amendment has been
made binding upon the states. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 35 U.S.L.
WEEx 4248 (U.S. March 14, 1967) (right to a speedy trial); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right of defendant to be confronted with the
witnesses against him which includes the right of cross-examination);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right of an indigent de-
fendant to secure court appointment of counsel); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948) (providing defendant the right to a public trial).
In Ford v. Boeger, 362 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1966), the court discussed
the possible applicability of the Cheff rule to state proceedings. How-
ever, it appears that the court was under the mistaken belief that thejury requirement applied to state proceedings.
18. See Burdick, Problems and New Developments in Contempt,
43 N.D.L. Rnv. 237, 241 (1967).
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The six-month exception parallels the requirement of the Crimi-
nal Justice Act that counsel be provided for indigents in all
criminal cases except the petty offense,19 defined as one carrying
a penalty of less than six months.20  Furthermore, according to
the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan, the Cheff majority was
comprised of two justices who believed that the six-month ex-
ception was constitutionally required, and four justices who re-
lied upon the supervisory power but also found the constitutional
question difficult. 21 Thus, when faced with a conviction which
it cannot handle under its supervisory powers, the Court may
recognize that the six-month rule has constitutional force.
In addition to the constitutional question raised by Cheff,
the propriety of the six-month rule is subject to question. In
support of the rule is the realization that severe penalties may
result from criminal contempt proceedings and that the common
law exception of petty offenses cannot be maintained in the face
of current ideas of justice.22 On the other hand, the courts must
not be unduly hindered in the administration of justice,23 and
the imposition of community sentiment through the jury may
19. In every criminal case in which the defendant is charged
with a felony or a misdemeanor, other than a petty offense, and
appears without counsel, the United States commissioner or the
court shall advise the defendant that he has the right to be
represented by counsel and that counsel will be appointed to
represent him if he is financially unable to obtain counsel ....
62 Stat. 814 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3006 A(b) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
From the Court's reference to the criminal code in defining a petty
offense and the general structure of the opinion, it appears that the
Court intended the six-month standard to be connected to the Constitu-
tion. See 384 U.S. at 378-79. But see Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907
(1966), where the Court, by denying petitioner's request for writ of
certiorari, in effect affirmed the Arkansas court's determination that all
misdemeanors are excluded from the constitutional rule of Gideon v.
Wainwright. Since some misdemeanors in Arkansas are punishable by
up to three years imprisonment, the Court in Winters appears to have
departed from utilizing severity of the punishment in deciding which
crimes will be denied constitutional protection and instead relied on a
felony-misdemeanor distinction.
20. See note 12 supra.
21. 384 U.S. at 381.
22. See United States v. Thompson, 214 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1954),
where the Court affirmed several sentences ranging from three to four
years imprisonment.
23. See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924)
(essential to the administration of justice); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289,
303 (1888) (inherent power essential to the execution of the courts'
powers); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873) (power
essential to the preservation of order and necessary to the due adminis-




unduly handicap the ability of the courts to enforce their or-
ders. 24 Faced with these competing interests, the six-month rule
appears to be a reasonable compromise.
Although the Cheff decision imposes a reasonable limitation
based upon the duration of imprisonment, it is deficient in several
important respects. The standard adopted totally disregards the
use of punitive fines in lieu of or in addition to imprisonment.
Although the courts may be limited to fines of five hundred dol-
lars by the statutory definition of petty offense,25 it is arguable
that this limitation may not be applicable, thus presenting an op-
portunity for violation of the Court's intent in advancing the
six-month rule.
Furthermore, the Court disregarded the diverse nature of
criminal contempt as a substantive offense.26 Criminal contempt
may involve insults to the dignity of the court which occur in
court as well as out of court. The language of the Cheff rule
precludes consideration of the nature of the behavior which gave
rise to the contempt citation and thus deprives the court of flexi-
bility in its administration of justice. Finally, under this rule,
the court must make a pretrial determination as to the possible
sentences it may impose in order to determine whether it is re-
quired to grant a jury trial. If the court recognizes the possi-
bility of imposing a sentence of more than six months a jury
trial will be necessary. However, if the court does not anticipate
a sentence of more than six months, but changes its mind after
hearing the evidence, it may be forced to impose a lesser sen-
tence than required by the facts of the case, or declare a mistrial.
It is suggested that a better solution is to make the place
and the effect of the contempt determinative as to whether a
jury trial is required.27  In the normal situation the right to a
jury trial will be preserved, and the jury can act as a buffer be-
24. "Among the prominent shortcomings of the new rule, which are
simply disregarded, is the difficulty it may generate for federal courts
seeking to implement locally unpopular decrees." 384 U.S. at 382 (Har-
lan, J., concurring). For a general discussion of the benefits of summary
power see Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. Rxv. 994(1965); Note, 65 YATE L.J. 846 (1965).
25. See note 12 supra.
26. See 384 U.S. at 380.
27. See the Civil Rights Act, 71 Stat. 638 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1995
(1964), which provides either a limitation upon the penalty which may
be imposed or the right to a jury trial in all contempt proceedings
except "contempts committed in the presence of the court or so near
thereto as to interfere directly with the administration of justice . .. ."
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 has an idertical provision. 78 Stat. 268
(1964), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(h) (1964).
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tween the government and the defendant without posing a seri-
ous threat to the administration of the law. However, because
the orderly administration of justice requires summarily dispos-
ing of some cases without a jury trial, the defendant would not
be entitled to a jury trial for contempts which occured in the
presence of the court or which would directly interfere with that
administration. In these cases the appellate courts would serve
as a safeguard against excessive sentences.28 However, beyond
setting a constitutional minimum, the balance between the com-
peting interests of defendant's right to a jury trial and the need
for an effective judiciary is best left to the legislature.
Copyright: Right of Copyright
Owner To Suppress Publication
Defendants prepared a biography of Howard Hughes for
publication. As completed, the biography contained two direct
quotes and an eight line paraphrase from a series of copyrighted
magazine articles. Upon learning of the forthcoming publica-
tion, Hughes caused plaintiff, a corporation which he indirectly
controlled, to purchase the copyrights to the magazine articles.1
Plaintiff then commenced an action to enjoin publication of the
book, alleging an infringement of copyright. Finding that a
prima facie case of infringement had been shown and that de-
fendants' commercial motive in publishing the book precluded
the defense of fair use, the district court granted a preliminary
injunction.2 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the fair
use defense was not limited to noncommercial uses of copy-
righted material and that, since plaintiff had shown neither prob-
able success at trial nor imminent and irreparable injury, the pre-
liminary injunction was an inappropriate remedy. Rosemont En-
terprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F. 2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
28. The "discretion" to punish vested in the District Courts by§ 401 is not an unbridled discretion. Appellate courts have here
a special responsibility for determining that the power is not
abused, to be exercised if necessary by revising themselves the
sentences imposed.
United States v. Green, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958).
1. Before purchase of the magazine copyrights, Hughes' attorneys
had attempted to persuade or threaten Random House not to publish
the book. Brief for Appellant, pp. 68a-71a, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc.
v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).




A nonfictional writing may be thought of as a composite of
four elements: facts, ideas, the collection and organization of
facts and ideas, and the specific sequence of words chosen to
express facts and ideas. 3 The copyright protection accorded to
such a writing does not extend to the facts4 and ideas5 contained
therein even if the author discovered the facts through his own
research and personally created each of the ideas.6 The author
may not even be protected against an appropriation of the entire
collection of facts and ideas contained in his work.7 The prin-
cipal, and probably sole, function of copyright is to protect the
copyright owner from unauthorized uses of the manner of expres-
sion chosen to relate facts and ideas."
In the instant case, therefore, the plaintiff could have no
right of action under the copyright law based on proof that fact-
ual material appearing in defendants' biography was taken from
the copyrighted magazine articles. Copyright protection existed
only as to the two direct quotations in the biography which were
taken from the copyrighted articles of plaintiff. However, even
if copyright protection has been infringed, the defendant may
still raise the defense that the copying was a fair use of the
copyrighted material.9
3. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Presenta-
tion of Facts, 76 HAnv. L. REv. 1569, 1578 (1963).
4. Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83, 86 (2d
Cir. 1939); Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632,
638 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
5. See, e.g., Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 534
(S.D.N.Y. 1941), affd, 150 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
790 (1946).
6. Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 632, 638
(S.D. Cal. 1935).
7. For cases holding no infringement by similar factual pattern-
ings concerning historical events see, e.g., Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Pub-
lications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957) (article on Lincoln's assassi-
nation using plaintiff's work published in magazine did not infringe);
Lake v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Cal.
1956) (radio episodes on the life of Wyatt Earp did not infringe the
biographer's copyrights). See also Gorman, supra note 3, at 1578.
Contra, Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950),
(compilation of facts for a biography of Hans Christian Andersen in-
fringed by defendant's later biography); Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass.
1942) (copyrighted publication containing horse racing information
held infringed by defendant); NIMmER, COPYRIGHT § 29.4 (1963).
8. Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 817 (1962); Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune
Ass'n, 275 Fed. 797 (7th Cir. 1921).




If infringement is shown and the defense of fair use fails,
the question arises whether proof that the plaintiff's sole reason
for acquiring the copyright to the magazine articles is to suppress
publication of defendants' biography constitutes a defense to the
action. A concurring opinion, 10 in which two members of the
three-judge panel joined, indicated that copyright protection
would be precluded altogether when the proprietor's sole motive
is to suppress information he does not want publicized. The
opinion reasoned that the policy of the constitutional grant and
the copyright law-to provide protection as an incentive to cre-
ation-precludes efforts, such as that of the plaintiff, to use this
law to suppress copyrighted material." Furthermore, since the
life of Howard Hughes is a matter of public interest, the first
amendment would prohibit suppression of writings concerning
his life.
Although the Supreme Court has never directly considered
the question of whether a copyright may be used for the pur-
pose of suppression, its decisions involving patent suppression are
relevant since the patent and copyright laws derive from a com-
mon constitutional base.' 2 In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. East-
ern Bag Co.,'8 the Court stated that the exclusive right to make
or vend, conferred by the patent law, generally included the ex-
clusive right to suppress. However, because the patentee's sup-
pression was not found unreasonable, 4 the Court reserved the
question of whether suppression would be protected in every in-
stance.' 5 In Special Equipment Co. v. Coe,'6 the holding of the
Continental case was reaffirmed but, again, the Court failed to
decide whether an unjustifiable suppression would be protected.
10. The concurring opinion might arguably have some stare de-
cisis effect, since it represents a majority of the three-man panel. This
might work in three ways: a) the trial judge might subsequently feel
bound by the concurring language, even though the holding of the
case was narrower; b) should the result of the trial be appealed, the
Second Circuit panel, even though of a different composition than that
sitting on the instant appeal, might feel bound to some extent; c) courts
in later cases might feel some binding effect.
If the tial judge upon remand felt bound by the concurring opinion,
a directed verdict for defendant would seem to be his only course of
action.
11. 366 F.2d at 311.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (8).
13. 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
14. Id. at 428-29. The patentee sought to protect his financial in-
terests in a related patent. Id. at 428.
15. Id. at 429.
16. 324 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1944), 93 U. PA. L. REV. 456 (1945); Note,
58 HI- v. L. Ray. 726 (1945); Note, 31 VA. L. REv. 668 (1945).
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This attitude was extended to copyrights in Fox Film Corp.
v. Doyal,17 where the Court, citing Continental, stated in dictum
that a copyright owner may "refrain from vending or licensing
and content himself with simply exercising the right to exclude
others from using his property."' 8 In view of its derivation, this
statement arguably should be interpreted as permitting only a
reasonable use of a copyright to suppress as, for example, where
a copyright owner suppresses to protect his financial interest
in a related work. But even so, these decisions do not support the
view that suppression may be a ground for denial of copyright
protection even where the suppression is unreasonable.
It is also difficult to justify the position of the concurring
judges in Rosemont, both as a matter of copyright policy and con-
stitutional law. Section 1 of the Copyright Law accords the
owner of copyright in a published work the "exclusive right...
to print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work
.... "19 Section 28 provides that a copyright "may be assigned,
granted, or mortgaged ... ."2o Thus, the statutory language
seemingly treats copyright as a traditional property right, with
the resulting implication that a copyright owner enjoys unlimited
control over the protected work.21 Nevertheless, courts have
distinguished copyrights from other personal property,22 and
have been unwilling to extend unlimited power of control to
the owners of literary or artistic property. For example, the
doctrine of fair use is a limitation judicially imposed to permit
reasonable criticism and analysis of published works.2
3
That the extent of copyright protection should not be gov-
erned by traditional notions of property right is evident. Con-
gress is constitutionally empowered to grant copyrights "to pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts .... ,,24 In con-
sonance with this directive,25 the policies underlying copyright
17. 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
18. Id. at 127.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 28 (1964).
21. "An author or proprietor of a literary work or manuscript pos-
sesses such a right of sale as fully and to the same extent as does the
owner of any other piece of personal property." Maurel v. Smith, 271
Fed. 211, 214 (2d Cir. 1921). See also Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate
Hotel Co., 58 F. Supp. 523, 534-35 (D. Neb. 1944).
22. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 135, 139, 89 N.E.2d
863, 865 (1949).
23. See BALL, COPYRIGHT AND IATERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (8).
25. For analyses and histories of the constitutional clause, see Bow-
HER, COPYRIGHT ITS HISTORY AN ITS LAW (1912); TAuBmAw, Copy-
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legislation have been found to be based upon public, rather
than private, interests. Personal benefit to the copyright owner
is not a primary consideration: 26 "The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in
the general benefits derived by the public from the labor of
authors."27  It is unavoidable that such policies will, at times,
conflict with the essentially private interests represented by
rights to tangible personal property. Thus the question whether
a copyright may be used to suppress is not capable of solution
by analogy to personal property rights.
In certain instances the right to suppress copyrighted ma-
terial is clearly desirable and necessary. Assume, for example,
the owner of copyright in a published nonfictional writing pro-
cures a revision of that work. After the revision has been pub-
lished,28 the owner will probably choose to discontinue publica-
tion of the original. However, publication of the original by
others could severely injure him competitively. The right to
suppress the original supports the economic value of the revi-
sion. If that right were denied, the incentive to produce the
revision would be sharply reduced.
If suppression is, in any case, to be a ground for denial of
copyright protection, the limitation must be restricted to situa-
tions in which copyright policies are not served by the right to
suppress. Since the evident purpose of the purchase of the
magazine copyright was to suppress a publication regarded by
Hughes as an invasion of his privacy,29 Rosemont would appear
to be such a case. The right to suppress to protect against inva-
sions of privacy would not foster creative incentive. It is un-
likely that an author would be motivated to write a biographical
or historical work by the possibility that, subsequent to its pub-
lication,30 some person will purchase and suppress the work to
RIGHT AND ANTITRUST 5-41 (1960); Penning, The Origin of the Patent
and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929); Note,
Copyright-Study of the Term "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of
the Constitution, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1263 (1956).
26. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); EvANs, CoPYRIGHT
AN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 29 (1949); cf. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
27. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
28. The revision would be copyrightable independent of the origi-
nal. 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1964).
29. 366 F.2d at 311.
30. A work which is suppressed prior to publication would not be
affected by the construction of the copyright law propounded by the




However, even in such situations, there is little justification
for a denial of copyright protection. Because the protection
given a copyright holder does not extend to the factual material
and ideas contained in the protected work, copyright is an inef-
fective tool for the guarding of privacy. Defendants in the in-
stant case could have appropriated all factual material contained
in the copyrighted articles without fear of liability. Thus the
benefit which would flow from a denial of relief to a copyright
holder who has attempted to suppress to maintain his privacy
is minimal.
Further, to withhold protection in such instances would cause
a certain disadvantage. Creation is encouraged when the validity
of a copyright can be established with certainty and without re-
sort to litigation.3 1 A denial of copyright protection to a plaintiff
who has suppressed to preserve his privacy would necessarily
rest upon a finding as to the intent and purpose of the copy-
right holder. Instances will arise in which the facts lend them-
selves to conflicting inferences of intent. Validity of the copy-
right could, in such situations, be determined only by litigation.
In copyright law, as elsewhere, many problems can be satis-
factorily resolved only by rules of law which raise difficult prob-
lems of proof. However, such solutions should be preferred only
when the benefit derived therefrom outweighs the effect of the
uncertainty which they cause.
The first amendment furnishes no greater support for the po-
sition of the concurring judges in Rosemont. Their notion that
the first amendment limits, in some way, the scope of copyright
protection is perhaps best supported by analogy to recent Su-
preme Court decisions, involving actions for defamation and
invasion of privacy, in which concern is expressed about the ef-
fect of potential liability on the free expression of ideas.
In New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan,32 the Court found that
the public interest in broad and varied criticism of public of-
ficials required that damages for a defamatory falsehood not be
awarded to a public official unless it is proved that the state-
by a common law rather than statutory copyright. Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Straus, 147 Fed. 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1906); Estate of Hemingway v. Ran-
dom House, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 726, 729, 268 N.Y.S.2d 531, 535 (Sup. Ct.
1966); Phillip v. Pennell, [19073 2 Ch. 577; DRONE, COPYRIGHT, 100-03
(1879).
31. See Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 COLUm.
L. REV. 503, 514 (1945).
32.. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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ment was made with actual malice-with knowledge of its fal-
sity or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity The same
test was extended to matters of public interest when, in Time,
Inc. v. Hill,38 it was held that the first and fourteenth amend-
ments preclude a state from awarding damages for invasion of
privacy in the absence of actual malice. The Court stated that
"exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concom-
mitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this ex-
posure is an essential incident of life in a society which places
a primary value on freedom of speech and of press."3' 4
The nature of the restraint on the freedom of speech imposed
by the copyright law differs substantially from that feared by
the Court in Sullivan and Hill. Copyright in no way limits the
content of permissible speech or writing. It demands only that
the specific sequence of words contained in a protected work not
be copied. Therefore no actual restraint is imposed on the free
exchange of ideas.
The assumption underlying the position of the concurring
judges, that suppression of copyrighted material can effect a
result contrary to the policies of copyright legislation and the first
amendment, is unfounded. Suppression should not be recognized
as a ground for demal of copyright protection.
33. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
34. Id. at 388.
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